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ABSTRACT 
The work of John von Neumann in the 1940’s on self-reproducing machines as 
models for biological systems and self-organized complexity provides the 
computational legacy for CAS.  Following this, the major hypothesis emanating from 
Wolfram (1984),  Langton (1992, 1994), Kaufmann (1993) and  Casti (1994) is that 
the sine qua non  of complex adaptive systems is their capacity to produce novelty or 
‘surprises’ and the so called Type IV innovation based structure changing dynamics 
of  the Wolfram-Chomsky schema.  The Wolfram-Chomsky schema  postulates that 
on varying the computational capabilities of agents, different system wide dynamics 
can be generated: finite automata  produce Type I dynamics with unique limit points 
or homogeneity; push down automata produce Type II dynamics with limit cycles; 
linear bounded automata generate Type III chaotic trajectories with strange attractors.  
The significance of this schema is that it postulates that only agents with the full 
powers of Turing Machines capable of simulating other Turing Machines, which 
Wolfram calls computational universality can produce Type IV irregular innovation 
based structure changing dynamics associated with the three main natural exponents 
of CAS, evolutionary biology, immunology and capitalist growth.   
Langton (1990,1992) identifies the above complexity classes for dynamical systems 
with the halting problem of Turing machines and famously calls the phase transition  
or the domain on which novel objects emerge as ‘life at the edge of chaos’.  This 
paper develops the formal foundations for the emergence of novelty or innovation.  
Remarkably, following Binmore(1987) who first introduced  to game theory the 
requisite dose of mechanism with players modelled as Turing Machines with the 
Gödel (1931) logic involving the Liar or the pure logic of opposition, we will see that 
only agents qua  universal Turing Machines which can make self-referential 
calculation of hostile objectives can bring about adaptive novelty or strategic 
innovation.             .     
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I.  Introduction 
The work of John von Neumann in the 1940’s  on self-reproducing machines as 
models for biological systems and self- organized complexity provides a landmark 
transformation of  dynamical systems theory based on motion, force and energy to the 
capabilities and constraints of information processors modelled as computing 
machines. 1  Following this von Neumann computational legacy on CAS,  the major 
hypothesis emanating from Wolfram (1984),  Langton (1992, 1994), Kaufmann 
(1993) and  Casti (1994) is that the sine qua non  of complex adaptive systems is their 
capacity to produce novelty or ‘surprises’ and the so called Type IV innovation based 
structure changing dynamics of  the Wolfram-Chomsky schema.  The Wolfram-
Chomsky schema  postulates that on varying the computational capabilities of agents, 
different system wide dynamics can be generated: finite automata  produce Type I 
dynamics with unique limit points or homogeneity; push down automata produce 
Type II dynamics with limit cycles; linear bounded automata generate Type III 
chaotic output trajectories with strange attractors.  The significance of this schema is 
that it postulates that only agents with the full powers of Turing Machines capable of 
simulating other Turing Machines, which Wolfram calls computational universality 
can produce Type IV irregular innovation based structure changing dynamics 
associated with the three main natural exponents of CAS, evolutionary biology, 
immunology and capitalist growth.  Indeed, Goldberg  (1995) claims that the mystery 
shrouding innovation can be dispelled .. “by a heavy dose of mechanism. Many of the 
difficulties in the social sciences comes from a lack of a computational theory of  
actor innovation …. .  population oriented systems are dominated by what economists 
call the law of unintended consequences (which is itself largely the result of the 
innovative capability of the actors )” (ibid. p.28, italics added).  
This paper builds on Binmore’s (1987) seminal work that introduced to game 
theory this requisite dose of mechanism with players as Turing Machines and the 
Gödel (1931) logic involving the Liar or the rule breaker.  Binmore(1987) indicated 
that that latter will provide the generic framework for the strategic necessity for the 
endogenous generation of indeterminism in the system by the actions of highly 
computationally intelligent agents.  There is also a long standing tradition, albeit an 
informal one, in the macro economics policy literature introduced by Lucas(1972) on 
the strategic use of ‘surprises’.  However, in extant game theory whether eductive or 
evolutionary there is no notion of innovation being a Nash equilibrium strategy  let 
                                                          
1 Mirowski(2002) discusses how radical a shift this has been for the methodology of science and also 
from the perspective of von Neumann’s earlier work with Oscar Morgenstern on the Theory of Games 
and Economic Behaviour .   
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alone one that is necessitated as a best response by a structure of opposition.  As in 
traditional Darwinian evolution, in economic models innovation is either introduced 
at a random rate or as an ad hoc addition in the form of trend growth.  
   This paper develops a computational theory of actor innovation by combining 
a game theoretic framework with the Emil Post (1945) set theoretic proof of  the 
epochal Gödel (1931) incompleteness result.  The latter shows that the conditions of 
opposition  between two Turing Machines and for  these machines to recognize their 
mutual hostility are the logically necessary conditions for  innovative outcomes that 
have an encoding beyond algorithmic enumeration. Gödel (1931)  had seminally used 
the notion of the Liar, the agent who falsifies or controverts, to embody the pure logic 
of opposition.  However, the Liar can falsify or contravene with certainty only from a 
computable fixed point.  This is intuitively well understood in the Lucasian thesis on 
policy ineffectiveness that regulatees can contravene policy only if the policy 
outcomes can be rationally expected.  When there is mutual recognition by the players 
of the structure of opposition, the so called fixed point with the Liar can be fully 
deduced to be a non-computable fixed point. 2   Any total computable function from 
this non-computable fixed point referred to as the productive function in Post’s set 
theoretic proof of Gödel incompleteness result, shown to represent the best response 
function in a game theoretic framework,  can only map into a set that cannot be 
recursively enumerated, viz. by a Turing Machine.  This coincides with the notion of 
the strategic use of surprise as intuitively proposed by Lucas (1972). The 
corresponding equilibrium Type IV dynamics converges  to the non-computable 
domain within the productive set which is disjoint from the so called creative set first 
defined by Post (1944) in the context of undecidable decision problems.  It is in this 
context, that Casti (1994, pp. 143-149) makes  the connection between complex 
undecidable dynamics and ‘surprises’.   
Langton (1990, 1992) identifies the analog between the Wolfram-Chomsky 
complexity classes, the halting problem and the phenomenon of phase transitions and 
colourfully refers to the phase transition associated with Type IV dynamics as “life at 
the edge of chaos”.  The latter epithet arises for the following reason that the creative 
set on which Turing Machines halt is associated with Type I and Type II dynamical 
systems with limit points and limit cycles, which Langton calls (computable) order.  
There is a set disjoint to the creative set on which Turing Machines3  can be logically 
deduced to be incapable of halting and it represents systems with Type III chaotic 
dynamics.  Both of these sets represent attractors for dynamical systems that cannot 
produce novelty.  The domain for novelty producing Type IV dynamics lies outside 
both these sets.  No finite meta model can ever computably identify the novelty based 
change in the structure of this system. Though not fully formally understood as this, 
again the predictive failure of econometric meta models is well known to economists 
as the Lucas Critique (1976) due to a lack of structural invariance that follow from 
strategically induced innovation.  Finally, systems capable of endogenous novelty 
generation experience a critical slowing down at the phase transition between the two 
other domains of (computable) order and chaos as the system at this juncture is 
                                                          
2 Gödel’s analogue of the Liar proposition is the undecidable proposition , say A, which has the 
following structure : A ↔ ~ P (A).  That is, A says of itself that it is not provable ( ~ P). However, 
there is no paradox here as it is indeed true that this is so.  Any attempt to prove the proposition A 
results in a contradiction with both A and ~A,  its negation, being provable in the system.  
3 Technically, these disjoint sets are recursively enumerable but their complements are not.  If this were 
not to be the case, the system will be complete in that no novel encoded objects (not already in these 
sets) can ever arise.  
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effectively involved in an irreducible process of calculation  of an undecidable global 
ordering problem of Gödel’s Diophantine degree of complexity. 
  The above indicates that  Nash equilibria in which agents innovate as a best 
response to evade hostile objectives of other agents and produce novel objects not 
previously in action sets is currently outside the ambit of traditional game theory.  The 
latter, without the scope of the mathematics of incompleteness, can only consider 
randomization and not innovation in zero sum and oppositional situations. 
   Remarkably, despite the deep mathematical foundations of CAS on the 
ubiquitous structure of opposition formalized in the Liar and the capacity for self-
referential calculations by agents of hostile behaviour of other agents, systems capable 
of adaptive novelty are commonplace and by and large only involve the intuitively 
familiar notion of the need to evade hostile agents.   Markose (2003) refers to this as 
the Red Queen dynamics that exists among coevolving species.  In Ray’s classic 
artificial life simulation called Tierra, Ray (1992), when some agents perceive that 
others are parasitic on them, they start hiding their whereabouts and also mutate to 
evade the parasite.  Recent research on RNA virus (see, Solé et. al. 2001) has likewise 
identified a ‘phenotype for mutation’, viz. a behavioural or strategic response 
favouring novelty, which is a far cry from the notion of random mutation.  Axelrod  
(1987) in his classic study on cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour in 
governing design principles behind evolution had raised this crucial question on the 
necessity of hostile agents :“ we can begin asking about whether parasites are inherent 
to all complex systems, or merely the outcome of the way biological systems have 
happened to evolve” (ibid. p. 41).  It is believed that with the computational theory of 
actor innovation developed in this paper,  we have a formal solution of one of the long 
standing mysteries as to why agents with the highest level of computational  
intelligence are necessary to produce innovative outcomes in Type IV dynamics. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.1 gives a brief 
overview of the von Neumann computational legacy of modern complex adaptive 
systems theory.  In 2.2, the mathematical prerequisites are given for the formal 
modelling of computationally intelligent  agents as “parametrized decision 
algorithms”, Arthur (1991), that is, agents whose behaviour is brought about by 
finitely encodable algorithms.  Some elements of Gödel  meta-mathematics and the 
limitative results on computability are also introduced with a brief discussion of their 
relevance for game theory.  Specific to this is the capacity of Turing Machines to 
make self-referential calculations.  Further,  computability constraints on strategic 
decisions and best response functions enable us to use some classic results from 
computability theory such as the Second Recursion Theorem for the specification of 
fixed points.  This was first introduced to Economics in the context of the generic 
non-computability problem of rational expectations equilibria by Spear (1989).  In 
section 3.1, I extend this framework  for the characterization of  dynamical system 
changes  in a two person game under conditions of cooperation and opposition.  In 
section 4,  a formalization of Gödel’s logic of pure opposition with the Liar or the 
contrarian/hostile agent is given.   The mutual self-referential recognition of  hostility 
that only agents with the highest powers of computational intelligence qua Turing 
Machines are capable of doing, will be shown to be a necessary condition for the 
strategic use of ‘surprise’.   
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2.  Computation and CAS Complex Dynamics 
2.1 von Neumann Computational Legacy of CAS  
The von Neumann models based on cellular automata4 have laid the ground 
rules of modern complex systems theory regarding  -(i)  the use of large ensembles of 
micro level computational entities or automata following simple rules of local 
interaction and connectivity,  (ii) the capacity of these computational entities to self-
reproduce and also to produce automata of greater complexity than themselves and  
(iii) use of the  principles of  computing machines to explain diverse system wide or 
global dynamics.  
The significance of the von Neumann computational legacy of CAS is that it 
covers all substrata, ranging from the bio-chemical to the artificial, in which effective 
procedures or computation reside.  By the Church-Turing thesis (see, Cutland 1980) 
the intuitive notion of an effective procedure or an algorithm can be identified with 
the class of general recursive functions and represent finitely encodable programs 
implemented in a number of  equivalent ways referred to as automata or mechanism.  
The best known among these idealizations of mechanism is the Turing Machine (TM, 
for short) and no mechanism can exceed the computational powers of Turing 
Machines. Such a definition of mechanism or formalistic calculation is necessary 
before complexity measures of the disjunction between the microscopic elements of 
the system and their macroscopic properties can be ascertained and also on what 
constitutes an innovation or surprise in the system.  
In keeping with (i) above, as observed by Arthur (1991), the units of modern 
adaptive models are “parametrized decision algorithms” or units whose behaviour is 
brought about by finitely encodeable algorithms.  Indeed, Langton (1992) notes that 
physical dynamical systems “are bound by the same in principle limitations as 
computing devices” (ibid.p82).  These limitative results of computing devices are 
generically referred to as the halting problem.  Church’s Theorem and in particular the 
Gödel (1931) First Incompleteness Theorem  show how  Turing machines themselves 
can produce encoded objects  (viz. by mechanizing the exit route in Georg Cantor’s 
famous diagonal method )  that cannot be enumerated  by any machine.  Such objects 
are innovations in the system and technically do not belong to recursively or 
algorithmically enumerable sets on which Turing machines halt. With regard to this 
Mirowski (2002) has correctly asserted that mathematicians “finally have blazed the 
trail to a formalized logical theory of evolution ”(ibid. p.141).  In other words, 
dynamical system outcomes produced by algorithmic agents need not be computable 
and fail to be systematically identified by codifiable meta models.  This is referred to 
as undecidable dynamics.  Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Result shows that it is 
precisely when systems isomorphic to number theory are consistent that internal 
consistency, which is a strongly self-referential system wide property often regarded 
as the hallmark of rational order, cannot be established by an algorithmic decision 
procedure.  Gödel (1931) axiomatically derived the undecidable proposition, the 
encoding of which represents the diophantine equation which has no algorithmic 
solution.5  This class well known as Hilbert’s Tenth problem has the highest degree of 
algorithmic unsolvability.   
                                                          
4 Cellular automata were developed by von Neumann and Stanislav Ulam to represent biological 
systems and for the purpose of modelling biological self-reproduction.  
5 Diophantine equations are polynomial equations with integer solutions. The irreducible nature of the 
computation here is that short of letting the system run its course there is no a priori systematic way to 
determine the solution to the problem.  
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Penrose(1988) was amongst the first to identify so called non-computable 
patterns or tiling problems, that nevertheless emerge from the execution of simple 
rules, with the Gödel incompleteness result.  However, what continues to remain a 
matter of considerable mystery,  to all scientists concerned with adaptive novelty , be 
they evolutionary biologists, immunologists, economists or physicists concerned with 
novelty producing self-organization systems ,  is why agents with the highest level of 
computational intelligence qua Turing Machines as postulated in the Wolfram-
Chomsky schema are necessary to produce adaptive novelty.   
Albin(1988, see Foley, ibid , pp. 42-45) consider the use of computationally 
intelligent agents in a game theoretic framework so as to resolve this matter.  
However, it was Binmore (1987) who made the seminal connection that the structure 
of the game in question that necessitates the use of surprise or innovation was 
precisely the one in Gödel (1931) that leads to the construction of the undecidable 
proposition.  
 
2.2 Gödel Meta- Mathematics And Prerequisites On Computability  
The main purpose of the formal analysis is to show the relevance of the Gödel 
paradigm  and the mathematics of incompleteness for the characterization of  systems 
capable of novelty based complex Type IV dynamics.  Gödel (1931) pioneered the 
framework of analysis called meta mathematics  pertinent to self-referential structures 
where he obtains epochal results on the sort of  statements an internal observer can 
make as a meta-theorist if he is constrained to be very precise in what he can know 
and how he can make inferences.  As highlighted by Binmore(1987), the theoretical 
significance of the analogue of the Gödel type incompleteness or indeterminacy result 
for formalized game theory stems precisely because this can be proven to arise not 
from incorrect or inconsistent reasoning or calculation but rather to avoid strategic 
irrationality and logical contradiction.  To this end instrumentally rational players are 
accorded the full powers of an idealised computation machine in the calculation of 
Nash equilibrium strategies and all information has to be in a codifiable form.  
Following from the Church-Turing thesis, the computability constraint on the decision 
procedures implies that these are computable functions that can only entail finitely 
specified set of instructions in the computation. Again by a method introduced by 
Gödel (1931) called Gödel numbering, all objects of a formalisable system 
describable on the basis of a countable alphabet are put into 1-1 mapping with the set 
of natural numbers referred to as their Gödel numbers (g.ns, for short).  Thus, 
computable functions  can be indexed by the g.n of their finitely encoded program.   
Impossibility results on computation therefore become the only constraints on what 
rational/optimizing players cannot calculate given the same information on the 
encoded primitives on the game.      
By the Church-Turing thesis computable functions are number theoretic 
functions,  f : N→ N where N is the set of all integers.6  Each computable function is 
identified by the index or g.n of the program that computes it when operating on an 
input and producing an output if the function is defined or the calculation terminates 
at this point.  Following a well known notational convention, we state this for a single 
valued computable function as follows 
                                                          
6 The first limitative result on functions computable by T.Ms is that at most there can only be a 
countable number of these with the cardinality of ℵ being denoted by ℵ0, while from Cantor we know 
that the set of all number theoretic functions have cardinality of 2ℵ0.  Hence, not all number theoretic 
functions are computable (see,Cutland,1980 ). 
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    f(x)  ≅  φa(x) =q .                                          (1.a) 
 
That is, the value of a computable function f(x) when computed using the 
program/TM with index a is equal to an integer φa(x) = q, if φa(x) is defined or halts 
(denoted as φa(x) ↓) or the function f(x) is undefined (~) when φa(x)  does not halt 
(denoted as φa(x) ↑).  The domain of the function f(x) denoted by Dom φa  or Wa is 
such that,  
 
   Dom φa  = Wa ={ x |  φa(x) ↓ : TMa(x) halts}.           (1.b) 
 
Definition 1: Computable  functions that are defined on the full domain of N are 
called total computable functions. Partial computable functions are those functions 
that are defined only on some subset of N.   
Related to (1.b) is the notion of sets whose members can be enumerated by an 
algorithm or a TM.   
Definition 2: A set which is the null set or the domain or the range of a 
recursive/computable function  is a recursively enumerable  set.  Sets that cannot be 
enumerated by  T.Ms are not r.e .   
The one feature of computation theory that is crucial to eductive game theory 
where players have to simulate the decision procedure of other players, is the notion 
of the Universal Turing Machine(UTM).  
Definition 3: The UTM is a partial computable function, defined as ψ(a,x), which 
uses the index a of the TM whose behaviour it has to simulate.  By what is called the 
Parameter or Iteration Theorem, there is a total computable function u(a) which 
determines the index of the UTM such that  
 
                       ψ(a,x) = φu(a)(x) ≅ φa(x) .                     (2)                 
 
 Equation (2) says that the UTM, on the left-hand side of (2) on input x will halt and 
output what the TMa on the right-hand side does when the latter halts and otherwise 
both are undefined. 
 Of particular significance are Turing Machines that use their own code/g.n as 
inputs in their calculation.  We will refer to these as self-referential calculations.   
Definition 4: The set denoted by C is the set of g.ns of all TMs that halt when 
operating on their own g.ns or alternatively C contains the g.ns of those recursively 
enumerable sets that contain their own codes (see, Cutland , 1980, p.123, Rogers, 
1967, p.62). 
 
       C = { x | φx(x) ) ↓ ; TMx(x) halts ;  x ∈ Wx }                              (3.a) 
 
The complement of C  
 
       C~ =  { x | φx(x) ↑; TMx (x) does not halt;  x ∉ Wx}                   (3.b). 
 
Theorem 1: The set C~   is not recursively enumerable.  
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In the proof that C~ is not recursively enumerable, viz there is no computable function  
that will enumerate it,  Cantor’s diagonalization method is used. 7  
 As indicated in the introduction,  what is remarkable is that the formal 
character of systems capable of the endogenous production of novelty based complex 
dynamics corresponds to the notion of  creative and productive sets first defined by 
Emil Post (1944) in the set theoretic proof  of the Gödel incompleteness result.    
 
Definition 5: A creative set Q is a recursively enumerable set whose compliment,  Q~, 
is a productive set.  The set Q~ is productive if there exists a recursively enumerable 
set Wx  disjoint from Q (viz. Wx ⊂ Q~) and there is a total computable function f(x) 
which belongs to Q~ - Wx.   f(x) ∈ Q~ – Wx is referred to as the productive function 
and is a ‘witness’ to the fact that Q~ is not recursively enumerable. Any effective 
enumeration of Q~ will fail to list f(x), Cutland (1980, p. 134-136).  
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Assume that there is a computable function f = φy , whose domain Wy = C~ .   Now, if y ∈ Wy , then y 
∈ C~  as we have assumed C~ = Wy . But by the definition of  C~ in (3.b) if y ∈ Wy , then  y ∈ C and not 
to C~ . Alternatively, if y∉Wy , y ∉C~ , given the assumption that  C~ = Wy . Then, again we have a 
contradiction, as since from (3.b) when y∉  Wy , y∈C~ .  Thus  we have to reject the assumption that for 
some computable function  f = φy  , its domain Wy= C~ . 
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We propose to show that f(x) the productive function which is proof of the 
incompleteness of the formal system also corresponds to the best response  surprise 
function in the Nash equilibrium of a game that produces the structure changing Type 
IV  undecidable dynamics.   The Langton (1990,1992) analog of the Wolfram- 
Chomsky complexity classes with the halting problem of Turing Machines may be 
given in terms of  Post’s  disjoint creative and productive sets defined above.   
The creative set on which Turing Machines halt is associated with Type 1 and  
Type II dynamics which can be called (computable) order.  The prototypical creative 
set is the set C in (3.a) which contains self-referential calculations that converge.   
They will be shown to correspond to computable fixed points.   Negation or 
computable contrarian propositions of the latter, on account of consistency of the 
system belong to a set disjoint from C and hence though a subset of the complement 
of C, viz. C~ in (3.b), its membership can be enumerated and also shown to be a set 
on which Turing Machines can be logically deduced to be incapable of halting.  Thus, 
there is a recursively enumerable subset of C~ and it represents systems with Type III 
chaotic dynamics.   The domain for novelty producing Type IV dynamics lies outside 
both these recursively enumerable disjoint sets.   
Figure 1 gives the set theoretic representation of the Wolfram-Chomsky 
schema of complexity classes for dynamical systems which formally corresponds to 
Post’s set theoretic proof of Gödel Incompleteness Result.       
  It is envisaged that with a minimum of details on computation theory and 
relying only on some familiarity with calculations involved in the determination of 
rational expectations equilibria which typically entail iteration and substitution, the 
main thrust of the paper can be followed.  As discussed, all finitely codifiable 
information on the game can be assigned g.ns including the calculations used in 
determining optimal strategies. The advantage of this framework is that all 
calculations can be reduced to operations on g.ns of functions as in (2).  Especially in 
the case of computability or non-computability of classes of fixed points or rational 
expectations equilibria we can obtain generic results, without the hard grind of 
producing any of the calculations or having to make ad hoc functional specifications. 
 
3. The Game Under Computability Constraints 
3.Implications of Computability Constraints on Decision Procedures   
The primitives of the game, best interpreted as one in which both cooperation and 
opposition arise such as in a regulatory /policy game or a parasite host game, is 
codified as follows.  
G= {(p,g), (Ap, Ag), s∈ S}.   
Here,(p,g) denote the respective g.ns of the objective functions, to be specified, of 
players, p, the private sector/regulatee and g, government/regulator. The action sets 
denoted by Ai are finite and countable with ail ∈ Αi ,  i∈ (g, p) being the g.n of  an 
action rule of  player i and l=0,1,2,.....,L.  An element s∈ S denotes a finite vector of 
state variables and other archival information and S is a finite and countable set.   
     Gödel meta analysis is analogous to that in chess or any other game where a 
unique correspondence can be established between moves played or those that can be 
potentially played with meta statements of these in some notation being stored in the 
meta system which is in the public domain.8   
                                                          
8 See Albin(1982) for a more rigorous discussion that all strategic analysis is meta analysis of this kind.  
 10
    A major implication of imposing computability constraints on all aspects of the 
decision procedures of the game is that all meta-information with regard to the 
outcomes of the game for any given set of state variables, s∈ S, can be effectively 
organized by the so called prediction function φσ (x,y) (s) in an infinite matrix Ξ of the 
enumeration of all computable functions, given in Figure 1 (see, Cutland, 1980, 
p.208). The tuple (x,y ) identifies the row and column of this matrix Ξ whose rows are 
denoted as Ξi, i= 0,1,2,......  . 
    
Figure2 : Meta –Information on Outcomes of Games 
Ξ0       φσ(0,0)     φσ (0,1)     φσ (0,2)     φσ (0,3)    .... φσ(0,y)     ....        
Ξ1     φσ(1,0)     φσ (1,1)     φσ (1,2)     φσ (1,3)    .... φσ(1,y)      ....            
Ξ2     φσ(2,0)     φσ (2,1)     φσ (2,2)     φσ (1,3)    .... φσ(2,y)      .....       
. 
Ξx    φσ(x,0)     φσ (x,1)     φσ (x,2)       φσ (x,3)    ....   φσ(x,x)     ..... 
.     
. 
 The function φσ (x,y) (s) if defined at a given state s and σ(x,y) yields 
                                             φσ (x,y) (s) =  q .                           
Here, q in some code, is the vector of state variables determining the outcome of the 
game.  Note, σ(x,y) is the index of the program for this function φ that produces the 
output of the game when one player plays strategy x and the other player plays a 
strategy that is consistent with his belief that the first player has used strategy y.  
Thus, (x,y) are the codes of the calculations involved for the determination of the 
strategies and the tuple also identifies a point on the matrix Ξ  in Figure 2.  The 
conditions under which the prediction function for each (x,y) point in the above 
matrix is defined is given in the following Theorem. 
  Theorem 2: The representational system is a 1-1 mapping between meta information 
in matrix Ξ  in Figure1 and internal calculations such that the conditions under which  
the prediction function which determines the output of the game for each (x,y) point is 
defined are as follows: 
 
                      φσ( , ) ( )x y s   ≅  φφ x y s q( ) ( ) ,=    iff  φx y( )  ↓ .   (4) 
Here the total computable function σ(x,y) modelled along the lines of  Gödel’s 
substitution function9 (see, Rogers, 1967,p.202-204) has the feature that it names or 
‘signifies’ in the meta system Ξ  the points in the game that correspond to the different 
internal calculations on the right- hand side of (4) as we substitute different values for 
(x,y).  The g.ns implemented by σ(x,y) can always be obtained whether or not the 
partial recursive function  )(yxφ on the right-hand side of  (4) which executes internal 
calculations halts or not. 
                                                          
9 This approach economizes on formalism and enables us to high light and exploit the Fixed Point 
Theorems of recursive function theory to determine Nash equilibrium outcomes more readily than has 
been the case in for instance in Anderlini(1991) , Canning(1992) and Albin(1982). 
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  Proof : See Appendix. 
 By the necessary condition in (4) if the function  φx (y) on the right-hand side 
executing the internal calculation is defined, we say the  prediction function φ in the 
meta system on the left-hand side producing the output of the game is computable and 
the outcome q of the game at that point is  predictable.  Likewise, the ‘only if ’ 
condition in (4) implies that meta statements that are valid on the predictability of the 
outcomes of the game at any (x,y) must give the correct inference on whether internal 
calculations on the right-hand side terminate. 
Only subsets of the sets defined by the rows of the above matrix, such that Eσi 
⊆ Ξi ,  i=0,1,2,.....  , can be taken to contain the outputs or the range of the functions 
used internally by the players making the calculations.10 What this means is that, 
though there is always some outcome existentially and reference to any point in Ξ can 
be made as a meta-proposition, there are points at which players in the system will fail 
to compute or predict these systematically or via an algorithm.     
On account of the ‘only if’ condition in Theorem 1, many interesting aspects 
of the Nash equilibria of computable games can be established only with reference to 
the meta analysis and information in the matrix Ξ , with no explicit reference to 
internal calculations being made by the players.  Thus, all Nash equilibria and other 
relevant fixed points of the game satisfying what has been referred to as consistent 
alignment of beliefs (CAB, for short, Osborne and Rubinstein,1994)have to be 
elements along the diagonal array of this matrix.  A typical Nash equilibrium is at a 
point defined by σ(x,x) , viz. say player p plays x and then g correctly identifies this.  
Off diagonal elements along any row defined by strategy, say x, employed by the 
player p, cannot be Nash equilibria, as these off diagonal terms imply that g is 
choosing his strategy assuming the wrong meta representation of p’s play. 
  
 3.2 Total  Computable Best Response Functions and Optimal Strategy 
Functions 
             A major advantage of this framework is that the determination of Nash 
equilibrium strategies involve the use of total computable best response functions  
(fp , fg) which can be shown to operate directly on points such as σ(x,x) to effect 
computable transformations of the system from one row to another of matrix  Ξ  with 
special reference to its diagonal array, see, Figure 2.  Thus,    
 
  )x,x(fi σφ (s)  ,                i ∈ (p,g).                               (5) 
 
The specification in (5) of how the response functions apply has a number of 
important implications.  As we will show, the Second Recursion Theorem can then be 
directly used for the determination of rational expectations equilibria where the 
constructive identification of the fixed point of the best response function enables 
both players to identify the same prediction function in the matrix  Ξ as producing the 
outcome of the game.      
Definition 5: The best response functions fi, i ∈ (p,g) that are total computable 
functions can belong to one of the following classes – 
 
                                                          
10 Here σi is the code of the function σ(i, j), j=0,1,2,3…  that enumerates the ith row of matrix Ξ.   
 12
                   fi =
Surprisef
BreakingRulef
BendingRulef
AbidingRule)FunctionIdentity(1
!
i
i
i
−
−
−
−
¬
+
     (6.a) 
 
such that the g.ns  of fi are contained in set ℜ, 
     ℜ = { m  | fi  = φm   , φm   is total computable}.       (6.b) 
 
The set ℜ which is the set of all total computable functions is not recursively 
enumerable. The proof of this is standard, see, Cutland (1980).  
 
The total computability of  best response functions fi = φm, m∈ ℜ  in (6.a,b) yields 
the notion of constructible/effective  action rules such that a finitely codifiable 
description of some (institutional) procedure which is defined for all mutually 
exclusive states of the world is obtained.  As will be clear,  (6.b) draws attention  to 
issues on how innovative actions/institutions can be constructed from existing action 
sets. The remarkable nature of the set ℜ  is that potentially there is an uncountable 
infinite number of ways in which ‘new’ institutions can be constructed from extant 
action sets A. 
 
Definition 6 : The objective functions of players are computable functions Πi , i∈ 
(p,g)  defined over the partial recursive payoff/outcome functions specified as in (4).
  
Arg 
ii Bb
max
∈
Πi  (φ )s()^b,b( gpσ ) ,        i∈ (p,g) .        (7)  
The Nash equilibrium strategies (βgE  , βpE )with g.ns denoted by  (bpE, bgE) entail two 
subroutines or iterations, to be specified later.  In principle, the strategy functions (βg , 
βp ) are  Universal Turing Machines that simulate optimal strategies of the players that 
satisfy (7) and involve the total computable best response functions (fp , fg)  which 
incorporate elements from the respective action sets A= (Ap ,Ag) and given mutual 
beliefs of one another’s optimal strategy.  In the two place notation given in (4), bp is 
the g.n of p’s strategy given that g has optimally chosen its strategy on the basis of g’s 
metarepresentation/belief,  bg^ , of p’s strategy .  Note that we will use g.ns zi, i∈ (p,g)  
to represent encoding of the optimization calculus with respect to respective objective 
functions. The problem is that actions can in general be implemented by any total 
computable function  response function,  fi = φm  , m∈ ℜ, i ∈ (p,g).  
In standard rational choice models of game theory, the optimization calculus 
in the choice of best response requires choice to be restricted to given actions sets. 
Hence, strategy functions map from a relevant tuple that encodes meta information of 
the game into given action sets 
 
               βi ( fiσ(x,x), z, s, A) → Ai  and  fi= φm  , m∈A,   i ∈ (p,g) .       (8.a)  
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Unless this is the case, as the set ℜ  is not recursively enumerable there is in general 
no computable decision procedure that enables a player to determine the other 
player’s response functions.  However, in principle, a strategic decision procedure  
(βg , βp )  for choice of best response, fi= φm  , m∈ ℜ, i ∈ (p,g), can map into  ℜ-A , 
implying that an innovative action not previously in given action sets is used.  
            
βi (fiσ(x,x)), z, s, A) → ℜ- A  and fi = fi ! = φm  , m∈ ℜ -A, i ∈ (p,g). (8.b) 
  
It has indeed been noted in passing by Anderlini and Sabourian (1995, p.1351), based 
on the work of Holland (1975), that heterogeneity  in forms does not arise primarily 
by random mutation but by algorithmic recombinations that operate on existing 
patterns.  However, a number of preconceptions from traditional game theory such as 
the ‘givenness’ of actions sets prevent  Anderlini and Sabourian(1995) from positing  
that players who as in (8.b), equipped with the wherewithal for algorithmic 
recombinations of existing actions, do indeed innovate from strategic necessity rather 
than by random mutation.  The innovation per se is emergent phenomena, but the 
strategic necessity for it is fully deducible. Indeed, it is the very function of the Gödel 
meta framework to ensure that no move in the game made by rational and calculating 
players can entail an unpredictable/surprise response function from set ℜ- A unless 
players can mutually infer by strictly codifiable deductive means from σ(x.x) that 
(8.b) is a logical implication of the optimal strategy at the point  in the game.  In other 
words, the necessity of an innovative/surprise strategy as a best response and that an 
algorithmic decision procedure is impossible at this point are fully codifiable 
propositions in the meta analysis of the game. While it will be shown that the specific 
structure of opposition logically and strategically necessitates surprise strategies in the 
Nash equilibrium of the game, in keeping with the set theoretic formulation of novelty 
production in Figure 1, the corresponding creative and productive disjoint subsets of 
the strategy sets have also to be developed.  These arise in the form of computable 
and non-computable Nash equilibria of the game.     
 
3.3 Fixed Point/Second Recursion Theorem and  Nash Equilibria 
The symmetric structure of the strategy function implies that meta analysis in the 
determination of  Nash equilibrium strategies (βpE , βgE) with g.ns (bpE, bgE ) can 
proceed from the perspective of one player or the other.  We will assume that the meta 
analysis proceeds form the perspective of g.  Calculations start at so called basepoint  
 
φσ ( )b,b aa ( s )=  q    .                       (9)  
 
Here, the prediction function is computable and outcomes of  a policy rule a is 
predictable and q is the desired outcome that g wants in state variables when applying 
this policy rule a .   In our two place notation σ( ba , ba ) ,  the first  ba  is the code of 
the program, as adopted by p to simulate the impact of the policy rule a that p believes 
that g will follow and the second place ba denotes that g believes and acts on the basis 
that the private sector has simulated policy rule a . It is convenient to assume that 
policy rule a is optimal for g if  the private sector is rule abiding. By rule abiding is 
meant that p will leave the system unchanged in terms of  the row  ba of matrix Ξ. 
Recursive identification of Nash equilibria or fixed points of the game utilizes 
the Second Recursion Theorem that any systematic/computable transformation by a 
total computable function f  of  the diagonal array in matrix  Ξ  is itself a row with a 
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g.n, say m, in Ξ  such that the m+1th. element in the mth row, Em,  is identical to the 
same entry in the diagonal array (see, Cutland, 1980, p. 208 ).   We will show how the 
players by substitution and iteration identify the fixed points of the game using the 
two following subroutines.  
Step1: Player g utilizes the UTM in (8.a) by  replacing σ(x,x) by σ( ba , ba )  and 
simulating p by setting i=p .  The fixed point of p’s best response function fp is 
identified in the following way.  The g.n of p’s optimal strategy is obtained by a total 
computable function b1, 
 
            bp* = b1 ( zp ; σ( ba , ba )  )                               (10.a) 
 
If bp* ≠  ba,  that is p’s optimal strategy is different from g’s initial belief that p is rule 
abiding, then g updates its belief and identifies *)b*,b( ppσ  to be the fixed point of 
p’s best response function fp.             
 Theorem 3 :(The Fixed Point Theorem11)  In a rational expectations equilibrium for 
the game at each stage, agents identify the same partial recursive prediction  function 
φ for the outcome of the game  
  
      )*b*,b(f ppp σφ (s)  = )*b*,b( ppσφ (s).                  (11) 
   
Here, *)b*,b( ppσ is said to be the fixed point of p’s best response function fp such 
that fp *)b*,b( ppσ and *)b*,b( ppσ  are indexes for the same partial recursive 
prediction function φ.   Thus, the index on the latter will predict the same outcome of 
the game on the right-hand side as does the index of the prediction function on the 
left-hand side of (11 ) if the function is computable at the fixed point.   
Proof proceeds by using the subroutine in (10.a) of  Step 1and using the Second 
Recursion Theorem outline above in Cutland (1980). 
Using the second subroutine or iteration  the g.ns ( bpE, bg
E ) of the Nash 
equilibrium strategy functions are fully definable in the system.   
Step 2: g applies the optimality algorithm using the meta information from the fixed 
point in *)b*,b( ppσ in (11)  and obtains  
 
                                        bgE = b2 (zg;  *)b*,b( ppσ ) .             (12.a) 
 
Likewise, player p uses information in the fixed point in (11) and infers that g will 
play bgE  in (12.a) and hence the g.n of  p’s Nash equilibrium strategy is given by 
                      
 bpE  =  b1 (zp ; b2 (zg;  *)b*,b( ppσ ) =  b2 (zp; bgE).         (12.b)  
  
4. Applications of the Fixed Point Theorem 
In this section we first use Theorems 2 and 3 to state the following Lemma on the  
                                                          
11 Spear (1989) has used similar ideas from recursive function theory to model the identification and 
learning problem in rational expectations equilibria.  The theorem involved here is the Second 
Recursion Theorem, see Cutland (1980) and in particular Rogers(1967) who gives this specific form. 
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computability or not of the fixed points of p’s best response function from the 
basepoint. 
Lemma 1: Corresponding to  player p’s best response function, 
 fp ∈{1, fp,+ fp¬ ) to g’s base point strategy  ba  that utilizes some a ∈ Ag  for any given 
s, the fixed point in (11) can be computable or non-computable.  If the prediction 
function φ indexed by *)b*,b( ppσ in (11) is computable, then by  
Theorem 1 the UTM in duplicator form *)(* pb bpφ  on the right-hand side of (4) halts 
with 
    )s(*)b,*b( ppσφ  = )s(*)b( p*pbφφ  and *)(* pb bpφ   ↓.  (13.a) 
If the prediction function φ  indexed by *)b*,b( ppσ  in (10) is not computable then by 
Theorem 1 the UTM  in duplicator form *)(* pb bpφ  on the right-hand side of (3) will 
not halt with  
          )s(*)b,*b( ppσφ  ~  )s(*)b( p*pbφφ     and *)b( g*bpφ   ↑.    (13.b) 
   Proof:  Use Theorems 2 and 3.                                                                          
 
 
4.1 Computable Fixed Points    
Note, the g.ns for p’s optimal strategy in the case fp ∈{ fp +, fp¬} will be respectively 
denoted by ba+ , ba¬ to correspond to whether p is rule bending or rule breaking. 
(i)The rule abiding case: If it is optimal for the p to be rule abiding viz. fp=1,  vis-à-
vis the generic predictable policy rule a in (9), then it simply leaves the system 
unchanged at the ba th. row of matrix Ξ in Figure2. )b,b( aaσ is a trivial computable 
fixed point and bgE=  ba is g’s Nash equilibrium strategy of the game. 
(ii) The rule bending case: The rule bender applies the best response function 
denoted by fp
+ on σ( ba , ba) and will move the system to a new row of the matrix Ξ 
with code ba+
  of the rule bending strategy fp+σ (ba , ba), such that the predicted 
outcomes in q (or some subset of them) specified as changes in state variables of 
policy are amplified but not controverted/subverted.  Formally, the predictable 
outcome of the game at the point σ( ba+ , ba ) belongs to the set  which is not disjoint 
with the set
ab
Eσ ,  viz. +σ abE  ∩ abEσ  ≠ ∅ . Τhe fixed point result necessary to 
determine the mutual Nash equilibrium strategies when the private sector has used the 
rule bending strategy  fp
+ σ ( ba , ba) is given as  
 
            
)b,b(f aap
+++σφ ( s) =  )s()b,b( aa ++σφ .                  (14) 
  
In the fixed point result in (14) as player g by using the index  σ( ba+ , ba+ ), (viz.when 
p has used ba
+  and g has updated its belief that p is indeed the rule bender) has 
identified the same function on the right hand side of  (14) as the other player p who 
plays fp
+ 
 and uses index fp
+σ ( ba +, ba+) on the left-hand side of (14), we say by 
Theorem 3 that both players have rational expectations of the game at this point.  If 
the base point for the a-rule in (9)  is computable, then there are no problems of 
computability regarding the fixed point in (13) for when the private sector is rule 
bending.     
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  We will now turn to the famous fixed point that fails to be computable such 
that the outcome of the game at this point is not predictable.  This is brought about by 
the Liar/rule breaker strategy. 
 
4.2 The Liar/Rule Breaker Strategy :The Logic of Opposition  
  For player p, for the given  (a,s) it may be optimal for p to apply the Liar strategy, fp
¬ 
σ( ba , ba ),  with code  ba¬ . Formally, the Liar strategy has the following generic 
structure.    
 For any state s when the rule a applies,    
        ~
)b,b(f
q)s(
aap
=φ σ¬  ,  q~  ∉ abEσ ↔ q)s()b,b( aa =φσ ,  q  ∈ abEσ .(15.a)  
 For all s when policy rule a does not apply, 
      fp
¬   =  0  : Do Nothing .                                                           (15.b)  
     
   The Liar can successfully subvert with certainty in (15.a) if and only if (↔) the 
policy rule a has predictable outcomes and fp¬  itself is total computable. Also,  
fp
¬ = φ m , m∈ Α p, must include a codified description of  an action rule if undertaken 
by the Liar can subvert the predictable outcomes of the policy rule a.  Formally, if q is 
predicted then the application of fp
¬  to σ( ba , ba ) will bring about an outcome q~  
∉ E
aσκ which belongs to a set disjoint from the set that contains the desired output of 
rule a for all s for which rule a applies, viz. E
aσκ ∩ E aσκ ¬ = ∅.  Τhe outcomes (q
~  
, q ) 
can be zero sum but in general we refer to property q~  ∉ E
aσκ in (15.a) as being 
oppositional or subversive.   This underpins the intuition behind Ray’s Tierra (1992) 
simulation where agents who recognize that they are hosts to parasites adopt the 
strategy for secrecy.  This is also well known from Lucas (1972) postulate on policy 
ineffectiveness in the case of fully anticipated policy and the wisdom behind the 
panacea that to forestall subversion, the policy rule must be undefined and fraught 
with ambiguity.  
 Thus, we come to the point as to why agents who precipitate the Wolfram-
Chomsky Type IV dynamics with innovation have to have powers of self-referential 
calculation.  Firstly,  g acknowledges the identity of the Liar in (15.a) and understands 
that  transparent rule a cannot be implemented rationally as the outcome now 
defined12 by φ
)b,b( aa
¬σ  (s) = q
~ is the opposite of what is optimal for g.  The latter is 
out of equilibrium.  Player g updates beliefs so that  formally we have the fixed point 
involving the Liar  which is σ (ba¬ , ba¬ ) where ba¬13   is the code for the Liar strategy 
in (15.a).  Now, the Liar, p, knows that g knows that p is the Liar.    
                                                          
12 In out two place notation, the first ba¬ is code for p’s Liar strategy and the second ba is code for g’s 
mistaken belief of p’s strategy. 
13 Formally, ba¬ may be viewed as the g.n of a refutable proposition in a formal system.  A refutable 
proposition is one whose negation (ba here) is provable in the system.  As theoremhood is a computable 
relationship, the g.n of the refutable proposition cannot belong to the domain of any computable 
function.   However, as ba is provable, the set of all such refutable functions is a recursively enumerable 
subset of  the domain of calculations such as φx(x), for all x, do not terminate.  
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Theorem 4:  The prediction function indexed by the fixed point of the Liar/rule 
breaker best response function fp¬ in (16) is not computable and corresponds to the 
famous Gödel non-computable fixed point. 
 
          φ
)b,b(f aap
¬¬¬σ (s) =  φ )b,b( aa ¬¬σ (s).       (16) 
 
The proof is standard.14 
4.3 Surprise Nash Equilibria 
  There is no paradox in stating that as both players can prove the non-
computability of (16) they will have mutual knowledge that the only Nash equilibrium 
strategies for both players that is consistent with meta information in the fixed point in 
(16), is one that involves strategies that elude prediction from within the system.  On 
substituting the fixed point σ (ba¬ , ba¬ ) in (16) for σ(x,x) in (8.b), g’s Nash 
equilibrium strategy βgE with g.n bgE  implemented by an appropriate total computable 
function such as  (12.a) must be such that  
    
       βgE (fgσ (ba¬ , ba¬ ), z, s, A) → ℜ- A  and fg = fgE! = φm  , m∈ ℜ -A. (17.a) 
 
That is, fg! implements an innovation and bgE ! is the g.n of the surprise strategy 
function in (20a) hence is the fixed point of fg !. 
Likewise for player p,  fp! implements an innovation in (17.b) and bpE ! is the g.n of 
the surprise strategy function viz. the fixed point of fp !.  Thus, 
          
βpE (fp σ (b1( ba¬),  b1( ba¬ )), z, s, A) → ℜ- A  and fp = fp E! = φm  , m∈ ℜ -A. (17.b) 
 
The intuition here is that from the non-computable fixed point with the Liar, the total 
computable best response function implementing the Nash equilibrium strategies can 
only map as above into domains of the action and strategy sets of the players that 
cannot be algorithmically enumerated in advance.  
Using Theorem 4 and Lemma 1, we will now prove the incompleteness results 
for the strategy sets of the players from the Liar/rule breaking strategy.  Analysis will 
be done for p’s strategy set Bp as the productive subset of p’s strategy set can be 
shown  to correspond with that of g. The total computable function b1 in (12.b) and 
Theorem (3.1,Cutland,1980, p.134) provides a 1-1 reduction between the former and 
the latter sets.  
Corresponding to those (agl , s) tuples, agl ∈ Ag  of g’s base point optimal 
strategy for which p’s best response fp   is to be rule abiding or rule bending, viz. fp ∈ 
{1,fp 
+ }, the g.ns of these optimal strategies for p, bp*∈ Bp result in computable fixed 
                                                          
14 Assume it is computable and the R.H.S of (18) produces the output q~ and the L.H.S by the definition 
of the Liar strategy produces output q.  However, if (18) is computable then we have q=q~ which is a 
contradiction.  
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points .  This set denoted by  ßp+ can be generated by eductive/recursive methodology 
entailed in the proof of Theorem 3.  Thus, 
 
  ßp+ = { ↓*)(|* * pbp bb pφ  for all (agl , s), agl ∈ Ag , fp ∈ {1,fp+ }}. (18.a) 
Likewise by Theorem 4 and Lemma 1, we can recursively generate a set ßp
¬ that 
contains the g.ns of p’s strategies for when it is optimal for p to use the Liar best 
response function fp
¬  to those (agl , s) tuples, agl ∈ Ag  of g’s base point optimal 
strategy.  By Theorem 4,  this is a set of p’s strategies that can be proven to result in 
non-computable fixed points.  Hence, 
            ßp¬ = { ↑φ *)b(|*b p*bp p  for all (agl , s), agl ∈ Ag , fp = fp¬ }.    (18.b) 
For the same (agl , s) tuple, agl ∈ Ag  constituting g’s base point optimal strategy, p’s 
optimal strategy bp* cannot belong to both  ßp+ and ßp¬ .  Hence, logical consistency 
of the meta analyis requires  ßp+  ∩ ßp¬ = ∅ and these are disjoint sets.   
Now, define the compliment set of  ßp+ denoted by ßp+c as 
 
 ßp+c  = { x | φx (x) ↑, x ∈ Bp }.                                   (19)  
As  ßp+  ∩ ßp¬ = ∅, the two sets are recursively enumerable disjoint sets with ßp¬ ⊆ 
ßp
+c by definition in (18.b).  Hence, the incompleteness of  p’s strategy set Bp that 
arises from the agency of the Liar strategy requires the proof that ßp+c is productive as 
in Definition 5 with the g.n of the surprise strategy  bpE !,  bpE ! ∈ ßp+c  - ßp¬. 
    
FIGURE 3 
  THE INCOMPLETENESS OF p’s STRATEGY SET Bp 
   bpE ! = b1 ( zp , b2 ( zg , ba
¬ )):SURPRISE STRATEGY 
 
                     
        •bpE ! = b1 ( zp , b2 ( zg  ; σ ( ba¬,ba¬  ) )   
   ßp
+                                               
 ßp¬       
 
 
 
   ßp+c 
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Theorem 5: The g.n of player p’s Nash equilibrium surprise strategy is defined as  
 bpE ! = b1 ( zp ; b2 ( zg  ; σ ( ba ¬ , ba ¬  ) ) from (12.b) having substituted in   
σ ( ba ¬ , ba ¬  ) from the non-computable fixed point in (16).  Then, by construction bpE 
is  a ‘witness’ for the productivity of the set ßp+c such that bpE !∈ ßp+c –ßp¬  and p’s 
optimal strategy set Bp  is incomplete .  As bpE ! is the g.n of the total computable best 
response function  fp! implementing the surprise or the innovation in the system as 
defined in (17.b), fp!  is the productive function for the set ßp+c.    
   Proof: See Appendix. 
    The significance of Theorem 5 is that the surprise strategy is fully definable as 
a meta–proposition and is paradox free as the surprise strategy is indeed a pure 
innovation in the strategy set Bp and outside of sets  ßp+ ∪ ßp¬  that can be 
enumerated by  eductive calculation and information in G, see Figure 3.  It is 
precisely the absence of logical inconsistency and strategic irrationality in the meta 
proposition on the surprise strategy that sustains the consistent alignment of beliefs 
condition of a Nash equilibrium with surprises.  Thus, as already observed, for human 
players utilizing ideal reasoning provided by Gödel meta analysis, the set ℜ of best 
response functions in (6.b) should provide an inexhaustible source of surprise or 
innovative strategies.  However, by the same token, by Theorem 5, there is no 
algorithmic way by which the prediction function with the index σ( bpE!, bpE!) at the 
surprise equilibrium can be mutually identified or learnt ex ante by the players in the 
system.  Indeed, σ( bpE!, bpE!) says that this is so self-referentially. 
 Theorem 5 and Figure 3 on the surprise strategy in a Nash equilibrium of a 
game formally corresponds to the set theoretic proof of Gödel’s undecidable 
proposition in miniature, Cutland (1980).  We have succeeded in showing the formal 
equivalence between the Nash equilibrium with surprise or novelty in Figure 3 and 
the phase transition in dynamical systems theory that characterizes the endogenous 
production of novelty as in Figure 1.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
     This paper sought to give the formal  foundations for the phase transition 
that  physicists (Langton,1990,1992) famously call “life at the edge of chaos”, viz. the 
domain in which novel objects emerge.   Following the seminal insight from 
Binmore(1987), we have shown the crucial significance of the Gödel (1931) 
incompleteness result for the formalization of a system with the endogenous capacity 
for  novelty production.  Indeed, as noted by Goldberg (1995)  a computational theory 
of actor innovation is needed for this. In addition to the formal Gödel structure of the 
Liar on the pure logic of opposition as being a necessary condition for evasive and 
innovative behaviour, Wolfram (1984) had conjectured that the highest level of 
computational intelligence, the capacity for self-referential calculation of hostile 
behaviour was also necessary.  Clearly, that agents with the highest level of 
computational intelligence qua Turing Machines are needed to produce adaptive 
novelty casts doubt on the Darwinian tradition that random mutation is the only 
source of variety.   
  In Markose (2003) it is argued that for systems to stay at the phase transition 
associated with novelty production requires the Red Queen dynamic of rivalrous 
coevolving species.  In the Ray’s Tierra(1992) and Hillis ( 1992)artificial life 
simulation models, once computational agents have enough capabilities to detect 
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rivalrous behaviour that is inimical to them, they learn to use secrecy and surprises.   
In a two person game with computational agents, this can be fully formalized using 
the Gödelian result on incompleteness. To show how with parallel computing agents, 
we have cooperation and competition not simply as in Prisoners Dilemma,  but with 
the use of periodic adoption of  new institutions outside of extant action sets, we need 
the new technology of virtual models of emergent phenomena.   
Finally, a matter that is beyond this paper, but is of crucial mathematical 
importance is that objects of adaptive novelty as in the Gödel (1931) result has the 
highest diophantine degree of algorithmic unsolvability of the Hilbert Tenth problem.  
This model of indeterminism is a far cry from extant modelling of adaptive innovation 
or strategic ‘surprise’ as white noise which in the framework of entropy represents 
perfect disorder, the antithesis of self-organized complexity.   It can be conjectured 
that a lack of progress in our understanding of market incompleteness and arbitrage 
free institutions is related to these issues on indeterminism.              
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: φσ ( x,y) (s) on the left-hand side of (4) is a UTM, 
denoted here as UTMσ  = ψ ((x,y),s).  As in (2) by the Iteration or the Parameter 
Theorem the g.n of  UTMσ is obtained uniformly by the total computable function σ 
from the indexes (x,y) of the function that it has to simulate on the right-hand side 
of (4). Thus, the so called substitution function σ (x,y) which implements the Gödel 
numbering of the prediction functions in matrix Ξ  in Figure 2  enumerates the same 
sequence of computable functions as does the partial recursive function φx (y)on the 
right-hand side of (4) which executes the internal calculations by agents in the 
system. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5: The proof entails showing that the best response 
function fp in (17.b) is the productive function denoted as fp! with the ‘!’ intended to 
focus on the feature that  an innovation outside given action sets is involved, viz. 
fp! = φm ,   m∈ ℜ -A.   We will use the two following Lemmas in the proof as well as 
the property of the set  ßp+c  given in (19).   
Lemma A.1:Since ßp+ contains those strategy functions with g.ns x such that φx (x) ↓, 
any total computable response function fp(x)  satisfies the condition that  φ pf (x) (y) ↓  
↔ φx (y) ↓.  Note also that the g.n of the strategy function β(fp(x)) is given by  b1(.) in 
(10.a, 12.b).   Therefore,  
      fp(x) ∈ ßp+ ↔  )x(fpφ  (fp(x)) ↓  ↔ φx (fp(x)) ↓ or fp(x) ∈ Wx = Dom φx . (A.1)   
However, if Wx is disjoint from ßp+ such that Wx ⊂ ßp+c  as φx (x) ↑ , then we must 
have  fp(x) ∈  ßp+c  - Wx  .  Assume the opposite viz. fp(x) ∈ Wx = Dom φx , then by the 
left hand side of (A.1), fp(x) ∈ ßp +  and also that x ∈ ßp +  and that φx (x) ↓.  The latter 
contradicts our assumption that Wx ⊂ ßp+c  as φx (x) ↑.  Such a  fp (x)  the g.n of which  
cannot be in the recursively enumerable sets ßp+ and Wx  is the productive function of 
the set ßp+c . 
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Lemma A.2 : Let Wx  ,Wx ⊂ ßp+c of Lemma A.1 be constructed as ¬+1nWσ to yield a 
non-repeating , recursive enumeration of ßp
¬ and surprise strategies thereof  with  
σ ¬ (.) denoting this total computable enumerating function such that 
¬
n
Wσ =  ßp
¬          ,     ßp
¬ ⊂ ¬
+1n
Wσ ,       (A.2) 
and, ¬
+1n
Wσ =  ¬nWσ ∪  {fp(σn
¬) } .            (A.3)   
Here with no loss of generality, let 
σn¬  ≡  σ ¬ ( ba¬ )                (A.4)        
signify the non-computable fixed point from p’s Liar/rule breaking strategy in (15.a) and 
Theorem 4 and    
             σn+1¬ =  σ ¬ ( bpE ! ) .    (A.5) 
In other words ¬
n
Wσ  
 contains a recursive listing of the members of ßp
¬  defined in 
(18.b) and surprise strategies thereof as {bo¬ , b 1¬ ,. . . . . . .,b n¬ }.  However, note in the 
construction of  ¬
n
Wσ  at no time can the g.n of fp(σn¬ ) ∈ ¬nWσ .  If the g.n of fp(σn
¬
 ) 
∈ ¬
n
Wσ , then following Lemma A.1 ( left hand side ), as fp is total, fp(σn¬ ) ∈ ßp+  and 
on using (A.4)  we have ↓¬¬ )( ab baφ .  However, this leads to a contradiction as from 
(15.a) ↑¬¬ )( ab baφ  and hence fp(σn¬ ) ∉ ¬nWσ   and cannot be recursively enumerated .  
Hence, fp(σn¬ )  is a productive function.  Note, that  bpE ! = b1 ( zp ; b2 ( zg ;σ ( ba¬, ba¬ ) 
is the g.n of  the Nash equilibrium surprise strategy with response function fpE! , and 
hence fp(σn¬ ) must be as required in (17.b), viz. fpE! = φm ,   m∈ ℜ -A.                           
 
  
 
